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SIXTH AMENDMENT-LIMITING THE
SCOPE OF BRUTON
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Richardson v. Marsh,1 the United States Supreme Court refused to expand a defendant's ability to prevent the admission of a
confession of a nontestifying co-defendant under the confrontation
clause 2 of the sixth amendment as originally prescribed in Bruton v.
United States. 3 In reversing the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,4 the Richardson Court held that "the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction
when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the
defendant's name, but any reference to her existence." 5 The Court
refused to extend Bruton to include situations in which all references
to the defendant are omitted from the confession, but other evi6
dence at trial nonetheless links the defendant to the confession.
This refusal exemplifies the Court's recent efforts to narrow the
scope of Bruton.
This Note examines the Richardson opinions and concludes that
in its effort to limit the holding in Bruton, the Court incorrectly interpreted the underlying principles of Bruton. This Note reasons that
the Richardson Court incorrectly assumed that the referral in Bruton
to "powerfully incriminating" confessions was limited to "facially
incriminating" confessions. Finally, this Note concludes that even
under the Court's "facially incriminating" standard, a confession
1 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).
2 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Richardson Court interpreted Bruton as holding that "a
defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant's confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at
their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the
codefendant." Richardson, 107 S.Ct. at 1704.
4 Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1986).
5 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709.
6 Id. at 1704.
984
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that replaces the defendant's name with a symbol or neutral pronoun is still violative of the confrontation clause despite the fact that
it does not expressly name the defendant.
II.

FACTS

The respondent, Clarissa Marsh, and her co-defendant, Benjamin Williams, were tried joindy 7 for the assault with the intent to
commit murder of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of Knighton's
son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott.8 Marsh's boyfriend, Kareem
Martin, was also charged with the same crimes but was a fugitive at
the time of the trial. 9
At trial, Knighton testified to the following sequence of events.
On October 29, 1978, Knighton and her son were visiting Scott at
her home when Marsh and Martin arrived. 10 As the parties were
conversing in the living room, Marsh said that she had come to
"pick up something" from Scott. 1 As Marsh rose from the couch,
Martin pulled a gun and pointed it at Scott and the Knightons, stating that "someone had gotten killed and [Scott] ... knew something
'
about it."12
Marsh then proceeded to walk over to the front door to
look out the peep hole. 13 After the doorbell rang, Marsh opened
the door, and Williams entered holding a handgun.' 4 As Williams
walked by Marsh, he asked: "Where's the money?"' 5 Martin then
took Scott upstairs while Williams searched the lower level of the
16
house, leaving Marsh and the Knightons alone in the living room.
The Knightons attempted to escape, but Marsh held them until Williams returned. 17 Williams told Knighton and her son to lie on the
floor and went upstairs, again leaving Marsh to watch the Knightons.' 8 Martin, Williams, and Scott came back downstairs a few min7 Marsh objected to the joint trial. Id.

8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. Knighton testified that she was upstairs with her son when she heard voices

from downstairs. Knighton came downstairs with her son, and Scott introduced her to
Martin and Marsh. Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1202.
11 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1704.

12 Id. Knighton testified that Marsh said something similar to Martin's statement as
she rose from the couch. Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1202.
13 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1704.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. While guarding the Knightons, Marsh remained at the front door and occa-

sionally looked through the peephole. Id.
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utes later, and Martin handed a grocery bag to Marsh. 19 Martin and
Williams then took Scott and the Knightons into the basement,
where Martin fatally shot Knighton's four-year-old son and Scott
20
and critically wounded Knighton.
Supplementing Knighton's testimony, the state also introduced
as evidence a confession by co-defendant Williams against the objections of Marsh. 2 1 The confession was redacted so as to remove
all references to Marsh, thus giving the appearance that only Williams and Martin had committed the crime. 22 The court instructed
the jury that the confession could only be used against Williams, not
against Marsh. 23 Although the confession was admitted, Williams
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1705. Marsh's attorney stated, "[t]here are certain inferences that are raised
by this statement even in its altered form that would tend to incriminate my client."
Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1202.
22 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1705. The confession read:

On Sunday evening, October 29th, 1978, at about 6:30 p.m., I was over to my girl
friend's house at 237 Moss, Highland Park, when I received a phone call from a
friend of mine named Kareem Martin. He said he had been looking for me and
James Coleman, who I call Tom. He asked me if I wanted to go on a robbery with
him. I said okay. Then he said he'd be by and pick me up. About 15 or 20 minutes
later Kareem came by in his black Monte Carlo car. I got in the car and Kareem told
me he was going to stick up this crib, told me the place was a numbers house.
Kareem said there would be over $5,000 or $10,000 in the place. Kareem said he
would have to take them out after the robbery. Kareem had a big silver gun. He
gave me a long barrelled [sic] .22 revolver. We then drove over to this house and
parked the car across the big street near the house. The plan was that I would wait
in the car in front of the house and then I would move the car down across the big
street because he didn't want anybody to see the car. Okay, Kareem went up to the
house and went inside. A couple of minutes later I moved the car and went up to
the house. As I entered, Kareem and this older lady were in the dining room, a little
boy and another younger woman were sitting on the couch in the front room. I
pulled my pistol and told the younger woman and the little boy to lay on the floor.
Kareem took the older lady upstairs. He had a pistol, also. I stayed downstairs with
the two people on the floor. After Kareem took the lady upstairs I went upstairs
and the lady was laying on the bed in the room to the left as you get up the stairs.
The lady had already given us two bags full of money before we ever got upstairs.
Kareem had thought she had more money and that's why we had went upstairs. Me
and Kareem started searching the rooms but I didn't find any money. I came downstairs and then Kareem came down with the lady. I said, "Let's go, let's go."
Kareem said no. Kareem then took the two ladies and little boy down the basement
and that's when I left to go to the car. I went to the car and got in the back seat. A
couple of minutes later Kareem came to the car and said he thinks the girl was still
living because she was still moving and he didn't have any more bullets. He asked
me how come I didn't go down the basement and I said I wasn't doing no shit like
that. He then dropped me back off at my girl's house in Highland Park and I was
supposed to get together with him today, get my share of the robbery after he had
counted the money. That's all.
Id. at 1705 n.1.
23 Id. at 1705. The court stated:
The statement of co-defendant Williams has been admitted into evidence against
him only. I caution you that it may be used in considering only the guilt or inno-
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24
did not testify at trial.
After the prosecution rested, Marsh was called to the stand and
testified that on October 29, 1978, she had lost her wallet containing Martin's drug money at a shopping center. 25 Martin became angry and suggested that Marsh borrow money from Scott, a woman
Marsh had worked with previously. 2 6 Martin and Marsh picked up
Williams and began driving to Scott's house. 2 7 Marsh, who was in
the back seat of the car, testified that she "knew that [Martin and
Williams] were talking," but their words were inaudible because
"the radio was on and the speaker was right in [her] ear."'28 Scott
admitted Martin and Marsh into her home. During a brief conversation, Marsh asked Scott for a loan.2 9 Martin then drew his gun as
Marsh went to the door to locate the car.3 0 Marsh then stated that
she did not know why she stopped the Knightons from escaping and
31
that "she did not feel free to leave and was too scared to flee."
Marsh, however, did testify that she took the grocery bag from Martin, but said she left the house without it after Williams and Martin
took the victims into the basement.3 2 Furthermore, Marsh insisted
that she did not know that Williams and Martin had guns and that
she never heard Williams or Martin talk about harming or killing
Scott or the Knightons. 33
Although the prosecutor instructed the jury not to use Williams' confession against Marsh,3 4 he nonetheless "linked [Marsh]
to the portion of Williams' confession describing his conversation

cence of Defendant Benjamin Williams. Under the rules already given to you, it
must not be used or considered in any way against Defendant Clarissa Marsh.
Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1203.
24 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1705.
25 Id.
26 Id. Marsh testified that she often borrowed money so Martin could buy drugs.
Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1203.
27 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1705.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1705-06.
34 Id. The prosecutor stated:
[T]he same law that applies to Mr. Williams applies to Clarissa Marsh as well. The
People must prove the same elements that I talked about in my discussion about Mr.
Williams. Her guilt, of course, is to be determined separately from the evidence but
you may consider the same evidence that you heard from the witness stand. The
only thing that the Court will instruct you that you cannot consider is that statement
that was made by the Defendant Williams. You cannot consider that statement
when you determine her guilt or innocence. To do so would be unfair.
Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1203.
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with Martin in the car" during his closing argument. 3 5 The jury
found Marsh guilty of two counts of felony murder and one count of
assault with the intent to commit murder.3 6 The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, 3 7 and the Michigan
38
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Marsh subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus3 9
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that her constitutional rights to confrontation under
the sixth amendment were violated when Williams' confession was
admitted as evidence. 40 The court denied the petition.41 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that "in determining whether Bruton bars the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession, a court must access the confession's 'inculpatory value' by examining not only the face of the
confession, but also all of the evidence introduced at trial." 4 2 The
Sixth Circuit also held that the conversation between Williams and
Martin in the car as described in Williams' confession was the only
direct evidence that Marsh knew of Martin's intentions to kill Scott
Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1706. The prosecutor said:
It's important in light of [respondent's] testimony when she says Kareem drives
over to Benjamin Williams' home and picks him up to go over. What's the thing
that she says? "Well, I'm sitting in the back seat of the car." "Did you hear any
conversation that was going on in the front seat between Kareem and Mr. Williams?" "No, couldn't hear any conversation. The radio was too loud." I asked
[sic] you whether that is reasonable. Why did she say she couldn't hear any conversation? She said, "I know they were having conversation but I couldn't hear it because of the radio." Because if she admits that she heard the conversation and she
admits to the plan, she's guilty of at least armed robbery. So she can't tell you that.
Id. at 1706 n.2. Marsh's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument.
Id. at 1706.
36 Id. at 1706.
37 No. 46128 (Dec. 17, 1980). The Michigan Court of Appeals found that malice
could be inferred because Marsh guarded the door, prevented the Knightons' escape,
and held the grocery bag containing the money. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
A split of opinion still exists on this Court over the issue of whether, in a felonymurder case, malice may be imputed from the underlying felony or merely inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the killing, including the underlying felony
.... We believe Fountainpresents the better view and hold that malice may not be
imputed, as a matter of law, from the underlying felony. Accordingly, the evidence
presented at the time of the motion had to sufficiently show that Williams acted with
the intent to kill or in reckless disregard of a known and high degree of risk that
death or serious bodily harm might occur.... [T]he evidence indicated that Marsh
knowingly participated in an armed robbery in reckless disregard of circumstances
that indicated a high degree of risk that death or serious bodily harm could result.
Id.
38 People v. Marsh, 412 Mich. 927 (1982).
39 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
40 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1706.
41 Civ. Action No. 83-CV-2665-DT (E.D. Mich., Oct. 11, 1984).
42 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1212).
35
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and the Knightons. 43 "In light of the 'paucity' of other evidence of
malice and the prosecutor's linkage of respondent and the statement in the car during closing argument, admission of Williams'
confession was 'powerfully incriminating to [respondent] with respect to the critical element of intent.' ',44 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari4 5 to address the conflict between
46
the Sixth Circuit's decision and the decisions of other circuits
which have declined to adopt the "evidentiary linkage" or "contex47
tual implication" approach to Bruton issues.
III.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

MAJORITY OPINION

In Richardson v. Marsh,4 8 the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that Marsh's
rights were violated under the confrontation clause.4 9 In writing for
the majority, 5 0 Justice Scalia argued that the present case did not fall
within the exception created in Bruton.5 1 The majority noted that in
Bruton the defendant was expressly named in the co-defendant's
confession while in the present case, the confession was not facially
incriminating against Marsh and only became so later at trial when
other evidence was properly introduced. 5 2 Justice Scalia concluded
that a jury is less likely to disobey instructions to disregard the evidence when it is required to make an inferential linkage between the
confession and other evidence introduced at trial than it would if the
53
confession was facially incriminating against the defendant.
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Court by briefly describing the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 54 The majority noted that the "right of confrontation includes the right to crossexamine witnesses," 55 and, thus, at ajoint trial, the pre-trial confes43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id. (quoting Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1213).
106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
See, e.g., United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487 (3rd Cir. 1979)(en banc).
Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1706.
107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).
Id. at 1709.

50 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined.
51 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1707.

52 Id.
53 Id.

54 Id. at 1706. Justice Scalia added that the sixth amendment was extended to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
55 Id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406-07 (1965)).
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sion of a nontestifying co-defendant cannot be admitted as evidence
against the defendant. 56 The Court also observed that the general
rule in joint trials is that "a witness whose testimony is introduced
... is not considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant if the jury
is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant" 5 7 because juries are assumed to follow the judge's
58
instructions.
Justice Scalia then noted that the Bruton Court had held that the
testimony of a nontestifying co-defendant at a joint trial which expressly implicates the defendant is a violation of the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause even if the jury is charged to
disregard the confession as to the defendant. 5 9 The majority argued
that this holding was a narrow exception to the general rule that
jurors follow their instructions. 6 0 Justifying the Bruton exception,
the Court stated:
"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the
defendant, are de'6 1
liberately spread before the jury in a joint trial."
Justice Scalia added that the co-defendant's confession in Bruton was
"powerfully incriminating" against the defendant because the con62
fession "expressly implicat[ed]" the defendant as an accomplice.
The majority next distinguished Bruton from Richardson, assert56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.

at 1706-07 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985)). Justice
Scalia listed a number of cases supporting the principle that the law assumes jurors are
capable of following their instructions. These cases included: Tennessee v. Street, 471
U.S. 409, 414-16 (1985)(instructions were given to the jury to consider accomplice's
confession against the defendant only to determine the truthfulness of the defendant's
assertion that his own confession was coerced); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,
438-39 n.6 (1983); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981)(instructions were given to
the jury to disregard eyewitness identification that was erroneously admitted at trial);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements coerced from the defendant which
are inadmissable as to the defendant's guilt because of a Miranda violation can be used
to impeach the defendant's credibility as long as the jury is instructed properly); Spencer
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)(evidence of prior convictions can be introduced for sentence enhancement if the jury is instructed that this evidence is not to be used to determine the defendant's guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)(instructions
were given to the jury to assess unlawfully seized evidence only to determine the defendant's credibility).
59 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1707.
60 Id.
61 Id. (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36)(citations omitted).
62 Id. (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 n.l, 135).
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ing that "in this case the confession was not incriminating on its
face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced
later at trial (the defendant's own testimony)." 63 Justice Scalia reasoned that a jury is less likely to disregard its instructions when it
has to make a linkage of this sort between the confession and other
evidence at trial. 64 The majority added that ajury may be unable to
disregard the confession if it contained testimony that "the defendant helped me commit the crime" because this type of testimony is
"more vivid than inferential incrimination, and hence more difficult
to thrust out of mind." 65 On the other hand, although it may be
difficult at times forjurors to disregard the co-defendant's testimony
as to the defendant, the majority concluded that "there does not
exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is
66
the foundation of Bruton's exception to the general rule."

The Court added that if the Bruton exception is limited to
"facially incriminating" confessions, it could still be complied with
67
by redaction, "a possibility suggested in that opinion itself."
However, if Bruton were extended to include confessions which incriminate the defendant by contextual linkage, the majority warned
that the trial judge would be unable to rule on the admissibility of
the confession until after the trial ended.68 This, Justice Scalia
claimed, would lead to manipulation by the defense attorney and, at
the very least, to numerous mistrials. 69 In response to the suggestion that the trial judge make a Bruton analysis at a pre-trial hearing
in which both parties introduce their evidence to the judge, the
opinion noted that this approach would probably not be possible
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 70 and, even if it
63 Id. at 1707. Justice Scalia added that the dissent had misconstrued the decision in
saying that the majority "assume[d] that [Williams'] confession did not incriminate the
respondent." Id. at 1707 n.3. Justice Scalia agreed with the dissent that the confession
would have harmed Marsh if the jury had disregarded its instructions. Id. However,
Justice Scalia stressed that the issue was not whether the confession incriminated Marsh,
but rather whether the trial court properly assumed that the jury did not use the confession against her. Id.
64 Id. at 1707.

65 Id.
66
67

Id. at 1708.
Id. (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10).

68

Id.

69 Id.
70 The

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other reliefjustice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confes-
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were, it would be "time consuming and obviously far from
71
foolproof.
Justice Scalia continued by arguing that ordering separate trials
for each defendant is also not a feasible solution. 7 2 The majority
noted that joint trials have been utilized in almost one-third of the
federal criminal trials in the past five years, 73 and they often prevent
inconsistent and inequitable verdicts.7 4 Many joint trials have numerous defendants, one or more of whom are likely to confess. 75
Justice Scalia argued that to require separate trials in every case in
which an incriminating confession was made would not only be inefficient but also unfair. 76 The majority opinion claimed that the
prosecution would have to present the same evidence at each trial,
"requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and
sometimes trauma) of testifying" 77 and giving "the last-tried defendants . . . the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case be-

forehand." 78 In response to the suggestion that the prosecution
forego the use of a co-defendant's incriminating confession in joint
trials, Justice Scalia asserted that this "price is also too high" 79 because confessions " 'are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and
o80
punishing those who violate the law.'
The Court disagreed with the dissent's assertion that "[flederal
prosecutors seem to have had little difficulty"8 1 implementing the
dissent's view of Bruton. The dissent reached this conclusion from
the fact that the only cases before this Court since Bruton were those
that originated in a state court.8 2 Justice Scalia stated that because
the number of cases was so small, "the fact that they happened to be
state cases may signify nothing more than that there are many times
sions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. Justice Scalia apparently believes that such a pre-trial hearing
would violate this rule because this rule limits the review of evidence introduced before
trial to an in camera inspection.
71 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1708.
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Memorandum from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 20, 1987)).
74 Id.

75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.

78 Id.
79 Id.

at 1709.

80 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986)(quotations omitted)).
81 Id. at 1708 n.4 (emphasis in original).
82 Id. at 1713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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more state prosecutions than federal."' 3 The majority argued that
the brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal of the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Richardson is also evidence that federal
prosecutors consider the dissent's interpretation of Bruton as harm84
ful to law enforcement efforts.
Justice Scalia concluded by noting that the premise that juries
follow their instructions is "rooted less in the absolute certitude that
the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the
defendant in the criminal justice process."8 5 The majority stressed
that Bruton was an exception to this rule,8 6 and it should not be extended to situations in which "the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to her
existence." 8 7 However, since the prosecutor during his closing argument attempted to subvert "the limiting instructions by urging
the jury to use Williams' confession in evaluating Marsh's case," 8 8
Justice Scalia held that the case should be remanded to consider
whether a writ of habeas corpus should be granted even though
Marsh did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at trial.8 9
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's opinion. 90 Justice
Stevens concluded that Bruton should apply to any inadmissible confession by a co-defendant that is "powerfully incriminating" against
the defendant. 9 1 The dissent argued that the Court drew "a distinction of constitutional magnitude" between confessions that are
facially incriminating and confessions that are incriminating by
linkage to other evidence. 92 Justice Stevens noted that, according to
the majority opinion, the exclusion of a statement would be based
on this distinction even though the indirectly incriminating confession may be more damaging to the defendant's case than the facially
incriminating confession. 93 The dissent also criticized the Court, asId. at 1708 n.4.
Id.
Id. at 1709.
Id.
Id. Justice Scalia added that "[wie express no opinion on the admissibility of a
confession in which the defendant's name had been replaced with a symbol or neutral
pronoun." Id. at 1709 n.5.
88 Id. at 1709.
89 Id.
90 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent.
91 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83

84
85
86
87
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serting that "neither reason nor experience supports the Court's argument that a consistent application of the rationale of the Bruton
case would impose unacceptable burdens on the administration of
94
justice."
Justice Stevens began his analysis by arguing that certain kinds
of hearsay " 'are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult
to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the
minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial
judge must give.' 95 The dissenting opinion then reasoned that
this principle was applicable to the Richardson facts. 96 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority opinion that a jury is less likely to
disobey instructions to disregard the confession if the confession
only incriminates the defendant by implication, rather than directly. 9 7 However, the dissent argued that Bruton did not mandate
the exclusion of all co-defendant confessions lacking the defendant's name. 98 Rather, Justice Stevens argued that confessions that
do not expressly name the defendant should be excluded on occasion because some of these confessions may be devastating to the
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)(emphasis in original)). Justice Stevens added thatJudge Learned Hand and
Justice Frankfurter have also supported this view. Id. at 1710 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the Bruton Court noted, Judge Hand found that the limiting instruction is a
" 'recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only
their powers, but anybody's else,' Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 [2d Cir.
1932]; 'Nobody can indeed fail to doubt whether the caution is effective, or whether
usually the practical result is not to let in hearsay,' United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d
360, 367 [2d Cir. 1948]; 'it is indeed very hard to believe that ajury will, or for that
matter can, in practice observe the admonition,' [United States v. Delli Paoli], 229 F.2d
319, 321 [2d Cir. 1956]. Judge Hand referred to the instruction as a 'placebo,'
medically defined as a 'medicinal lie.'"
Richardson, 107 S.Ct. at 1710 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at
132 n.8). Justice Frankfurter observed that " '[t]he Government should not have the
windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a
matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.' "
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248
(1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
96 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Bruton Court
framed the issue as " 'whether the conviction of a defendant at ajoint trial should be set
aside although the jury was instructed that a codefendant's confession inculpating the
defendant had to be disregarded in determining his guilt or innocence.' " Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-24). Justice Stevens added that the Bruton
Court answered that question in the affirmative, noting that a sixth amendment violation
occurs "'where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant,
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the
jury in a joint trial.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36).
97 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94
95
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defendant's case. 99 On the other hand, some confessions expressly
naming the defendant need not be excluded because they do not
prejudice the defendant at all.' 0 0 The dissent argued that despite
proper limiting instructions, "the very act of listening and seeing
will sometimes lead them [the jury] down the 'path of inference.' "101 Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court is only speculating that the limiting instructions will dissuade the jury from
considering the confession against the defendant. 0 2 The dissent
argued that, according to Bruton, the determination of whether a
confession is deemed "powerfully incriminating" should be made
on a case-by-case basis and should not be dependent on whether or
not the defendant was named in the confession.' 0 3
Justice Stevens next argued that Marsh's rights under the confrontation clause were violated because at the time Williams' confession was introduced at trial, the prosecutor clearly indicated that the
confession would incriminate both Williams and Marsh. 10 4 The dissent noted that the evidence had already shown that Marsh was at
Scott's home when the crimes occurred. 10 5 However, the evidence
was not as clear on the issue of "whether respondent herself intended to commit a robbery in which murder was a foreseeable result, or knew that the two men planned to do so."106
Justice Stevens reiterated that Williams' confession included
Martin's statement to Williams in the car that "he would have to
99 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

100 Id. at 1710 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

106 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that the "quantum of evidence admissible against respondent was just sufficient to establish this intent and hence
support her conviction." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the Sixth Circuit explained:
"jT]he issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Marsh aided and
abetted the assault with the specific intent to murder Knighton or with the knowledge that Martin had this specific intent .... Marsh's case presents a much closer

question on this issue than does Williams'. There was no testimony indicating she

harbored an intent to murder Knighton, nor was there any showing that she heard
Martin's statements regarding the need to 'hurt' or 'take out' the victims. There

was, in addition, no testimony placing her in the basement, the scene of the shootings. The evidence does indicate, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecu-

tion, that she was aware that Williams and Martin were armed, that she served as a
guard or 'lookout' at the door, that she prevented an attempted escape by
Knighton, and that she was given the paper bag thought to contain the proceeds of
a robbery. The evidence also indicates that Marsh knew Scott, supporting the infer-

ence that it was Marsh who allowed Martin to gain entrance. While it is a close
question, we believe the evidence presented at the time of the motion was sufficient

to survive a motion for directed verdict."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1204).
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take them out after the robbery."' 10 7 In addition, the dissent noted
that Knighton testified that Marsh and Martin arrived at Scott's
house together. 10 8 Thus, Justice Stevens reasoned that the jury
could not avoid the inference that Marsh was in the car and had
heard the conversation. 10 9 The dissent next argued that the confession was "of critical importance because it was the only evidence
directly linking respondent with the specific intent, expressed
before the robbery, to kill the victims afterwards." 110 Justice Stevens criticized the majority opinion for assuming that Williams' confession did not incriminate Marsh, stating that "[it is unrealistic to
believe that the jury would assume that respondent did not accompany the two men in the car but had just magically appeared at 1the
11
front door of the apartment at the same time that Martin did."'
Since Williams did not take the stand, Justice Stevens noted
that Marsh's lawyer did not have a chance to cross-examine Williams
to establish that the radio may have been too loud for Marsh to hear
the conversation with Martin. 112 Thus, the dissent argued that
Marsh had to try "to rebut the obvious inference that she had overheard Martin," giving the prosecutor yet one more chance "to point
to this most damaging evidence on the close question of her specific
intent." ' 1 3 Justice Stevens asserted that the fact that the confession
was not facially incriminating against Marsh but rather incriminating
only when considered in light of the other evidence "does not eliminate their common, substantial, and constitutionally unacceptable
risk that the jury, when resolving a critical issue against respondent,
114
may have relied on impermissible evidence."
Justice Stevens added thatJustice White's dissenting opinion in
Bruton did not interpret the Bruton majority opinion to include only
facially incriminating confessions:115
"I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial
confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants
other than the declarant are effectively deleted. Effective deletion will
probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be employed against those defendants
Id. at 1711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
''1 Id. at 1711 n.3. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1711-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1' Id at 1712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1712 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107

108
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once their identity is otherwise established."'1 16

Justice Stevens added that Justice White still adheres to this inter17
pretation of Bruton today.'
The dissent continued by analyzing the role ofjoint trials in the
administration of criminal trials."18 Justice Stevens admitted that
"joint trials conserve prosecutorial resources, diminish inconvenience to witnesses, and avoid delays in the administration of criminal
justice." 1 19 However, the dissent added that if a joint trial creates
"special risks of prejudice to one of the defendants," a severance
must be granted.' 20 Justice Stevens criticized the government's assertion that the costs to the state of using a severence instead of a
2
co-defendant's confession outweigh the benefits to the defendant' '
by noting that "on the scales ofjustice... considerations of fairness
122
normally outweigh administrative concerns."'
The dissent noted that the United States made a similar argument in Bruton. 123 QuotingJudge Lehman of the New York Court of
Appeals, the Bruton Court responded to these administrative concerns by saying:
"We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation
of the witnesses against him and the right to cross-examine them....
We destroy the age-old rule which in the past has been regarded as a
fundamental principle of our jurisprudence by a legalistic formula, required of the judge, that the jury may not consider any admissions
against any party who did not join in them. We secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price
of fundamental
principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too
24
high."1

Justice Stevens further criticized the Court's use of "irrelevant
statistics" to support its decision. 125 In response to the Court's as116 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 143 (White, J., dissenting)(emphasis added)).
117 Id. at 1712 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714,
1720 (White, J., dissenting)("[A] codefendant's out-of-court statements implicating the
defendant are not only hearsay but also have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion.... Bruton held that where the defendant has not himself confessed, there is too
great a chance that the jury would rely on the codefendant's confession.").
118 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1712 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
119 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing United States v. Lane, 106 S. Ct. 725, 732
(1986)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134)).
120 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131; FED. R. GRIM. P. 14).
121 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting)(citing Brief Amicus Curiae (Solicitor General) for Petitioner at 22, Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 85-1433)).
122 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Bruton, 391 U.S at 134.
124 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1712-13 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Fisher,
249 N.Y. 419, 432 (1928)(Lehman, J., dissenting)).
125 Id. at 1713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sertion that joint trials account for "almost one-third of federal
criminal trials in the past five years," the dissent highlighted the
Court's lack of precision by noting that "the Court might have
stated that there were 10,904 federal criminal trials involving more
than one defendant during that 5 year period." 12 6 Justice Stevens
added that the data did not specify how many of the joint trials con1 27
tained confessions by one of the defendants.
Justice Stevens continued his criticism of the majority by stating
that all cases before the Court in which the Bruton rule was at issue
originated in a state court. 128 The dissent, therefore, reasoned that
federal prosecutors, presumably through "the options of granting
immunity, making plea bargains, or simply waiting until after a confessing defendant has been tried separately before trying to use his
admissions against an accomplice," have been able to avoid "the
great harm to the criminal justice system" 1 29 that the Court asserts
will occur if the Bruton rule is extended to the facts of this case.
Justice Stevens labeled the Court's assertion, that the number
of cases containing a co-defendant's confession which does not
facially incriminate the defendant is too great to evaluate on a caseby-case basis, a declaration that "floats unattached to any anchor of
reality."1 30 Because the number of cases in which more than one
co-defendant confesses is small, the dissent reasoned that the
Court's concern of "presenting the same evidence again and again"
is "nothing but a rhetorical flourish" 1'3 because most cases would
require at most two trials, one for the confessing defendant and one
for the other defendant or defendants. 13 2 Furthermore, Justice Stevens commented that a joint trial can often be avoided because
"most confessing defendants are likely candidates for plea
33
bargaining."1
In response to the Court's belief that trial judges will be unable
to determine if a co-defendant's non-facially incriminating confession unfairly prejudices the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that
the judge will have no problem making this evaluation after the
126 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (Feb 20, 1987)).
127 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (March 25, 1987)).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 1713 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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prosecution rests.13 4 Furthermore, the dissent criticized the Court's
assertion that if Bruton is extended to encompass the facts of this
case, the result will lead to "manipulation by the defense."' i 5 Justice Stevens explained that the Court presumably meant that a defense attorney might "tailor [the] evidence to make sure that a
confession which does not directly mention the defendant is
deemed powerfully incriminating when viewed in light of the prosecution's entire case." 13 6 Justice Stevens expressed doubt that defense attorneys would "pursue this high-risk strategy of
'manipulating' [the] .. . evidence" to increase the inculpatory value
of the confession against their clients.' 3 7 The dissent added that
trial judges are very capable of controlling "problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges who are sometimes distracted by
illogical distinctions and irrelevant statistics."' 13 8 Justice Stevens
closed by stating that other than Williams' confession and the prosecutor's remarks at closing argument, which will be treated separately
on remand, "there was a paucity of other evidence" connecting
Marsh to Martin's statement in the car indicating his intent to kill
the victims. 13 9 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the Sixth Circuit was correct in deciding that this specific violation of the con140
frontation clause was not a harmless error.
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Included in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is
the right of an accused criminal defendant to cross-examine any witness who testifies against him. 14 1 The Supreme Court first articulated this point in Pointer v. Texas, 142 stating that "a major reason
underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with [a] crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witness against him."' 143 Prior to Pointer, the Supreme Court in Delli
Paoli v. United States 144 held that no constitutional violation occurs if
Id. at 1713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1713-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'39 Id. at 1714 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
142 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
143 Id. at 406-07.
144 352 U.S. 232 (1956). The facts of Delli Paoli resembled the facts of Bruton, 391 U.S.
123 (1968), discussed supra notes 148-57.
134

135
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a non-testifying co-defendant's confession is admitted into evidence, even if the confession makes reference to the defendant, as
long as the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the defendant's guilt. 14 5 The Court in Delli Paoli based its
holding on the long-standing premise that it is reasonably possible
46
for juries to follow sufficiently clear instructions.
In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and expressly overruled Delli Paoli, using principles underlying
the confrontation clause. 14 7 In Bruton, the co-defendant gave a postarrest confession which expressly implicated the defendant. 14 8 Because the co-defendant did not testify at the joint trial, a postal inspector testified regarding the confession. 4 9 The trial judge
instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's confession in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence because the confession
was inadmissible hearsay against the defendant.' 50 The Bruton
Court noted that if the jury did disregard the co-defendant's confession as to the defendant, no confrontation clause question would
arise because the situation would be as if the co-defendant made no
statement at all inculpating the defendant. 15 ' However, the Court
held that the admission of the co-defendant's confession violated
the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause because there
was a substantial risk that the jury would use the co-defendant's confession in determining the guilt of the defendant despite the limiting
52
instruction. 1
In overruling Delli Paoli, the Bruton Court relied on Justice
145 Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 237.
146 Id.

at 242.

147 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
148 Id. at 124.
149

Id.

The Bruton Court stressed that the co-defendant's confession was
clearly inadmissible evidence against the defendant under traditional rules of evidence.
Id. at 128 n.3 (citing Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43, 443-44
(1948) (holding that the co-conspirator's hearsay declaration was not admissible because
it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy to transport a woman for the purposes of
prostitution and because it was made in furtherance of a continuing subsidiary phase of
the conspiracy); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946)(holding that the confession of a co-conspirator after he was apprehended ended the conspiracy and rendered his confession inadmissible against his co-conspirator)). The Bruton Court cited
several authorities to support this proposition, including C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 239 (1954); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1048-49 (3d ed. 1940); Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159 (1954); Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921); Note, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 984-90
(1959); Comment, Post-ConspiracyAdmissions in Joint Prosecutions, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 710
(1957).
151 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
152 Id.
150 Id. at 125.
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Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli.'5 3 justice Frankfurter in Delli
Paoli directly attacked the majority's premise that juries are able to
follow their instructions, noting that "[t]he fact of the matter is that
too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective
in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be
wiped from the brains of the jurors."' 54 The Bruton Court conceded
that there are many circumstances in which ajury can be relied upon
to follow its limiting instructions. 15 5 Nevertheless, the Court agreed
with Justice Frankfurter, concluding that "where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant" are introduced at a joint trial, 15 6 a jury will be unable to disregard the
confession as to the defendant even if properly instructed to do
SO.157

B.

BRUTON'S "POWERFULLY INCRIMINATING"

STANDARD

In Richardson v. Marsh, Justice Scalia concluded that no Bruton
violation existed because Williams' confession was redacted and all
references to Marsh were omitted. 158 The majority concluded that
Williams' confession was not "facially incriminating" against Marsh,
as was the case in Bruton. 15 9 Even though Williams' confession inculpated Marsh when combined with other evidence properly introduced at trial, Justice Scalia held that Marsh's rights were not
violated under the confrontation clause because Marsh was not implicated by' the confession alone. 160 A careful analysis of Bruton
reveals, however, that the majority's interpretation of Bruton is erroneous, as Bruton was not based on this "facially incriminating"
distinction.
Although the co-defendant's confession in Bruton did "facially
incriminate" the defendant, the Bruton Court did not use this rationale to determine the standard for confrontation clause violations. 16 1
Rather, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Bruton, articulated
the standard in more general terms:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
Id. at 129.
154 Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
155 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135.
153

156 Id. at 135-36.
157 Id. at 129 (citing Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

158 Richardson, 107 S.Ct. at 1709.
159 Id. at 1707.
160

Id. at 1709.

Brief for Respondent at 16, Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 851433). See generally Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
161
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so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of

the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the
incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand
and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the
recognized motivation to shift blame onto others. The unreliability of
such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such
threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation
16 2
Clause was directed.

Thus, the Bruton Court held that the confrontation clause requires a
per se rule excluding the confession of a co-defendant if the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant and if the
confession is so "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant
that any limiting instruction given to the jury would be
63
ineffective.1
In Richardson, the first criterion set forth in Bruton was clearly
satisfied because Williams' confession was inadmissible hearsay
against Marsh under the Federal Rules of Evidence' 64 and because
Williams did not take the stand. However, the majority incorrectly
interpreted the second criterion of "powerfully incriminating" to
mean "facially incriminating."' 16 5 Justice Scalia remarked that "[o]n
the precise facts of Bruton, involving a facially incriminating confession, we found [the rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions]

inadequate.

.

.

.

[T]he

calculus

changes

when

confessions that do not name the defendant are at issue."' 166 Thus,
the majority would exclude all evidence from sixth amendment protection other than facially inculpatory co-defendant confessions, regardless of the incriminating effect on the defendant. 167 Clearly,
Justice Scalia's conclusion that a confession can only be "powerfully
incriminating" if it facially incriminates the defendant blatantly ignores the express language of the Bruton opinion and its precedents.
Justice Brennan laid the foundation for the "powerfully incriminating" standard of Bruton for co-defendant confessions in Douglas v.
U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
163 Marcus, The ConfrontationClause and Co-Defendant Confessions: The Driftfrom Bruton to
Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 566 (1979).
164 See FED. R. EvID. 801-06; see also sources cited supra note 150; see generally Marcus,
supra note 163, at 562 n.21.
165 See Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (emphasis added).
167 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Brief for Respondent at 19, Richardson v.
162 Bruton, 391

Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 85-1433).
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Alabama. 168 In Douglas, the defendant and an alleged accomplice
were tried separately for assault with the intent to murder. 169 The
alleged accomplice was tried first and found guilty. 170 The state
called the accomplice to testify at the defendant's trial. 17 ' However,
the accomplice refused to answer any questions on grounds of self17 2
incrimination because an appeal on his conviction was pending.
The trial judge thus allowed the prosecution to treat the accomplice
as a hostile witness. 17 3 The prosecutor subsequently read the accomplice's purported confession which implicated the defendant
and asked the accomplice to affirm or deny the statements. 174 Once
again, the accomplice refused to respond. 175 The Court noted:
The alleged statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the
State's case against the petitioner. The circumstances are therefore
such that "inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical
weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject176to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant."'
The Court thus held that the defendant's inability to cross-examine
the accomplice about the confession violated his confrontation right
177
under the sixth amendment.
Relying on Douglas,Justice Brennan noted in Bruton that the risk
of prejudice to the defendant was even more serious than it was in
Douglas.l78 Justice Brennan argued that the co-defendant's confession "added substantial,perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the
co-defendant] ... did not take the stand. [The defendant] ... thus

was denied his constitutional right of confrontation."' 1 79 Although
Douglas and Bruton involved confessions which facially incriminated
the defendants, Justice Brennan did not limit confrontation clause
violations to only those statements.18 0 Rather, any confession which
added substantial weight to the prosecution's case in a form not
subject to cross-examination would be deemed "powerfully incrimi168
169

380 U.S. 415 (1965).
Id. at 416.

170 Id.
171 Id.
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Id.
Id. at 416-17.
Id.
Id. at 420 (quoting Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1962))(emphasis

added).
177
178

Id. at 419.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127.

179 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
180

See Note, The Admission of a Codefendant'sConfession After Bruton v. United States: The

Questions and a Proposalfor Their Resolution, 1970

DUKE

L. REv. 329, 341.
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nating." In Richardson, Justice Stevens correctly argued that a codefendant's confession which implicates the defendant when combined with other evidence at trial certainly may add substantial
weight to the government's case just as easily as a confession which
directly implicates the defendant.' 8 ' This is especially true if the
government's case is based primarily on circumstantial evidence.
To hold that such linkage testimony does not violate the confrontation clause "ignores the true incriminating effect of the
82
statement."1
Moreover, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Bruton also
adhered to the proposition that "powerfully incriminating" is not
limited to facially incriminating confessions. Justice Stewart noted
that "the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when
the highly damaging out-of-court statements of a codefendant, who is
not subject to cross-examination, is deliberately placed before the
jury at a joint trial."' 1 3 Although Justice Stewart's choice of words
was slightly different from that of Justice Brennan, the meaning is
the same: a co-defendant's confession is "powerfully incriminating"
if it is highly damaging or adds substantial weight to the government's case.
Indeed, even Justice White, in his dissent in Bruton, agreed that
Justice Brennan did not intend to limit "powerfully incriminating"
confessions to "facially incriminating" confessions.' 8 4 Justice White
noted:
I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial
confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants
other than the declarant are effectively deleted. Effective deletion will
probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be emthose defendants once their identity is otherwise
ployed against
85
established.1
Justice White's dissenting opinion is highly significant because
neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinion in Bruton
discussed the effects the decision would have on the redaction process. Because Justice White was dissenting, his views may represent
the minimum standard that the prosecution will have to satisfy in
order to comply with Bruton.' 8 6 Justice White nonetheless correctly
Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Marsh, 781 F.2d at 1212.
183 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137-38 (StewartJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
184 Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
186 Marcus, supra note 163, at 575.
181
182
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asserted that under the majority opinion, a confession would still be
powerfully incriminating unless all statements which incriminated
the defendant, direct or otherwise, were deleted from the
confession.
Justice Scalia disagreed that redaction was discussed only in
Justice White's dissent, asserting that the majority opinion in Bruton
suggested that the principles of Bruton could be complied with by
redaction.' 8 7 Such a statement is misleading. The Court's exact
words in Bruton were: "Some courts have required deletions of reference to codefendants where practicable."'' 8 8 Such a statement
hardly implies that a redaction which omits all express reference to
the defendant will always protect the defendant's rights guaranteed
by the confrontation clause. In fact, the Court specifically cited authorities criticizing redactions. 8 9 In Richardson, even though Williams' confession made no reference to Marsh, the redaction was
still ineffective because the confession inculpated Marsh when it was
combined with other evidence introduced at trial. Since Williams'
confession was the only evidence that indicated that Marsh may have
known of Martin's intent to kill the victims, the confession added
substantial weight to the state's case. Thus, in light of the rest of the
opinion, the majority in Bruton would not consider a redaction that
omitted all reference to the defendant to be practicable if the confession was still "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant.
C.

THE "FACIALLY INCRIMINATING" STANDARD

In addition to disregarding the express language in Bruton, the
majority opinion in Richardson creates illogical results and ignores
the values of the confrontation clause that Bruton sought to protect.
As Justice Stevens noted in Richardson, the result of using Justice
Scalia's "facially incriminating" standard is that even if a jury's indirect inference from a co-defendant's confession is much more devastating than an inference from a direct reference in the confession,
only the latter statement would be excluded.' 90 The Bruton Court
clearly could not have intended such an illogical result. As the
Court concluded in Pointerv. Texas, 19' the purpose of the confrontation clause is to protect a criminal defendant from being unfairly
187 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1708.
188 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10.

189 Id. (citing Note, CriminalConspiracy, supra note 150, at 990; Comment, Post-Conspiracy Admissions inJoint Prosecutions,supra note 150, at 713; NoteJoint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 564 (1965)).
190 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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prejudiced by evidence which is inadmissible against him.19 2 A
nonfacially incriminating confession may certainly unfairly prejudice
the defendant as much as a facially incriminating confession. Justice
Stevens was, therefore, correct when he stated that the determination of whether a co-defendant's confession violates the confrontation clause should not be dependent upon whether the defendant is
named in the confession, but rather should be made on a case-bycase basis dependent upon whether the confession is "powerfully
193
incriminating."
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's "facially incriminating" standard
is flawed because it ignores the elements of the jury's decision-making process. Juries are instructed not to form conclusions until all
the evidence is introduced, thus giving the jury the opportunity to
194
view each piece of evidence in the context of the entire case.
Consequently, a piece of inadmissible evidence which inculpates the
defendant when linked with other evidence at trial may still have a
devastating effect against the defendant even though it is not facially
incriminating. Justice Stevens correctly noted that "the very acts of
listening and seeing will sometimes lead them [the jury] down 'the
path of inference.' "195 As the Bruton Court noted, if the testimony
adds substantial weight to the state's case in a form not subject to
cross-examination, "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to
the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
96
system cannot be ignored."'
Indeed, the facts of Richardson are a perfect example of the
problems created by the majority's "facially incriminating" distinction. Because Williams' confession was not facially incriminating as
to Marsh, Justice Scalia reasoned that it did not violate Marsh's
rights under the confrontation clause.' 9 7 However, at the time Williams' confession was introduced, Knighton's testimony had already
established that Marsh, Williams, and Martin had committed an
armed robbery at Scott's house and that Martin and Marsh had arrived together.19 8 Justice Stevens correctly reasoned that the jury
could not help but infer that Marsh was in the car and had heard
Martin's statement indicating his intent to kill Scott and the Knight192

Id. at 403.

193 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1710 (StevensJ, dissenting).
194 Brief for Respondent at 21, Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 85-

1433).
195 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135.
197 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709.
198 Id. at 1711 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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ons. 199 Williams' confession certainly added substantial weight to
the state's case and thus made it powerfully incriminating against
Marsh because it was the only evidence at trial that indicated that
Marsh may have known of Martin's intent to kill the victims. 2 0 0 In
addition, because Williams did not testify at trial, Marsh's attorney
had no opportunity to cross-examine him to establish that the radio
20 1
may have been too loud for Marsh to hear Martin's statement.
Thus, Justice Stevens was correct in concluding that the introduction of Williams' confession was a violation of the confrontation
clause even though the confession did not facially incriminate
Marsh.
D.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARGUMENTS IN RICHARDSON

Justice Scalia further tried to justify his "facially incriminating"
distiction by noting that "[w]here the necessity of such linkage is
involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely
obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. '20 2 However, the
majority cites no authority to support this conclusion. As noted
above, this conclusion was specifically incorrect in Richardson because Williams' confession added substantial weight to the state's
case in a form not subject to cross-examination. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's choice of words indicated the clear lack of certainty he
has for this proposition. By using phrases such as "the judge's instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering
onto the path of inference in the first place.. ." and "there does not
exist the overwhelmingprobability [that the jury will obey their limiting
instructions]," Justice Scalia showed that he was far from certain
20 3
about his conclusion.
In addition, Justice Scalia actually admitted to the logical weakness of his proposition and tried to rationalize his conclusion by using administrative arguments. The majority stated that
[t]he rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a
pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical
accommodation of the interests
of the state and the defendant in the
20 4
criminal justice process.
Justice Scalia thus attempted to justify his conclusion by arguing
199 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 1711-12 (Stevens, J, dissenting).

202 Id. at 1707.
203 Id. at 1708 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 1709.
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that the costs of requiring the prosecution to use separate trials or
foregoing the use of the co-defendant's confession outweigh the
benefits to the defendant. 20 5 It is true that joint trials "conserve
prosecutorial resources, diminish inconvenience to witnesses, and
avoid delays in the administration of criminal justice." 20 6 However,
to allow administrative concerns to prevail at the expense of fairness
and justice protected by the confrontation clause would be a dangerous practice. Justice Stevens correctly argued that the criminal
justice system pays too high a price when it protects " 'greater
speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at
the price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty.' "207
Although Justice Scalia and the state would prefer smoother administration in the criminal justice system at the expense of a fair trial
for the defendant, the Constitution does not tolerate such a
20 8
result.
Moreover, even if administrative issues are given more weight
than constitutional rights, Justice Scalia's concerns about administrative burdens on the criminal justice system are without merit.
The majority fears that a "contextual implication" reading of Bruton
will lead to mid-trial manipulation by defense attorneys. 20 9 Justice
Scalia presumably meant that a defense attorney may try to alter the
evidence at trial in order to create a powerfully incriminating inference against his or her client. 2 10 This argument, however, ignores
the realities of a criminal trial. As Justice Stevens argued, there are
few defense attorneys who would pursue this high risk strategy of
manipulating their evidence to create a powerfully incriminating inference if their client has any chance of acquittal.2 11 Even if a defense attorney did try to manipulate the evidence, Justice Stevens
correctly noted that trial judges are fully capable of "supervising
counsel in order to avoid problems that seem insurmountable to appellate judges."2 1 2 Furthermore, if the state had an exceptionally
205 Id. at 1708-09. See also Brief Amicus Curiae (Solicitor General) for Petitioner at 22,
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 85-1433).
206 Richardson, 107 S.Ct. at 1712 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lane,
106 S.Ct. 725, 732 (1986)).
207 Id. at 1713 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432
(1928)(Lehman, J., dissenting)).
208 See Brief for Respondent at 40, Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987)(No.
85-1433). See also Marcus, supra note 163, at 579 ("if the two values at issue are maintenance ofjoint trials and violation of Confrontation Clause principles, surely the fundamental considerations of the sixth amendment must prevail").
209 Richardson, 107 S.Ct. at 1708.
210 Id. at 1713-14 (StevensJ, dissenting).
211 Id. at 1714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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strong case against the defendant, the defense would not benefit by
manipulating the evidence to create a powerfully incriminating inference because any Bruton violation would be deemed a harmless
2 13
error.
Justice Scalia further argued that reading Bruton to encompass
"contextual linkage" confessions would be needlessly time-consuming and would lead to a trial before trial. 2 14 Other critics have
stressed that such a reading of Bruton would all but eliminate the use
ofjoint trials by forcing the state to expose its entire case on a motion for severence. 21 5 These assertions are without merit. At most,
trial courts would have to survey the co-defendant's statements and
order production of only those statements which could provide contextual linkage evidence. 216 Trial judges are well-equipped and
thoroughly familiar with complex discovery procedures. There is
no reason to believe they will have any more difficulty deciding this
issue than they would have with any other evidentiary matter.21 7 In
any event, even if the "contextual implication" reading of Bruton
does result in fewer joint trials and less efficiency in the criminal
justice system, this price is small compared to the consequences
arising from the jeopardizing of an individual's constitutional rights
of confrontation under the sixth amendment.
Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to request a severance in any
Bruton situation in which the defendant's confrontation rights are
threatened. Justice Scalia's argument conveniently ignores this duty
to provide the defendant with a fair trial.218 In Berger v. United
States,21 9 the Supreme Court stated:
213 See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973)(holding that the Bruton error
was harmless where "[t]he testimony erroneously admitted was merely cumulative of
other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury");
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (holding that "unless there is a reasonable
probability that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required"); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)(holding that
Bruton violations are subject to the harmless error test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and that the case against the defendant was so overwhelming
that the Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). In Richardson,Justice
Stevens correctly concluded that the admission of Williams' confession was clearly not a
harmless error because it was the only evidence linking Marsh to Martin's intent to kill
the victims. Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1714 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 1708.
215 Brief Amicus Curiae (Solicitor General) for Petitioner at 21, Richardson v. Marsh,
107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987)(No. 85-1433).
216 Marcus, supra note 163, at 580.
217 Id.
218 See generally Brief for Respondent at 42, Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702
(1987)(No. 85-1433).
219 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done ....
It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
2 20
one.
Thus, when a redacted confession implicates the defendant even
though the confession is not facially incriminating, the prosecutor is
under a duty either to request a severence or to seek alternative
measures.
Two such viable alternatives to traditional joint trials that Justice Scalia failed to recognize are bifurcation and multiplejuries. In
a bifurcated trial, the jury is permitted to hear all of the evidence
against the defendant except for the co-defendant's confession. After the jury hears closing arguments and reaches a verdict as to the
defendant, the trial judge then informs the jury about the co-defendant's confession. The jury is then allowed to hear the complete
confession and any other evidence pertinent to the co-defendant's
case. 22 1 Bifurcation thus grants the prosecution the value of the codefendant's confession against the co-defendant and, at the same
time, protects the confrontation rights of the defendant. In a single
trial, multiple jury procedure, a jury is chosen for each co-defendant. The jury for the defendant is excused when the co-defendant's
confession or any evidence relating to the confession is introduced
at trial. The juries hear separate closing arguments and subsequently render separate verdicts. 22 2 Similar to bifurcation, a multiple jury procedure enables the prosecution to use the confession
against the co-defendant, yet sufficiently protects the defendant
from unfair prejudice. These two methods, therefore, successfully
achieve a balance between the interests of the state and the defendant. The state obtains the same "speed, economy, and convenience" that it would normally obtain in a traditional joint trial, while
220
221

Id. at 88.
See Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsiderationof the ConfrontationRationale,

and a Proposalfora Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 1,
4 n.10 (1980); Note, Co-Defendant Confessions, 3 CoLuM.J.L. & Soc. PROB. 80, 93 (1967).
See, e.g., United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385, 1387 (6th Cir. 1974)(upholding the
defendant's conviction for armed robbery and noting that no prejudice occurred as a

result of using a bifurcated trial).
222 See Haddad, supra note 221, at 5 n.ll. See generally, Morris & Savitt, Bruton Revisited: One Trial/Two Juries, 12 PROSECtrrOR 92 (1976). See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 163
N.J. Super. 283, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)(holding that the employment of

three juries at the robbery trial of the defendant and his two co-defendants did not unfairly prejudice the defendant).
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the defendant receives adequate protection of his or her rights
under the confrontation clause.
E.

THE EFFECTS OF RICHARDSON ON CONFESSIONS WHICH REPLACE
THE DEFENDANT'S NAME WITH AN "X"

OR A "BLANK"

Finally, a confession in which the defendant's name has been
replaced by a symbol or neutral pronoun should be a violation of
the confrontation clause even underJustice Scalia's "facially incriminating" standard. The Supreme Court expressly avoided deciding
this issue in Richardson.2 2 3 Should the issue arise in the future, it
seems apparent that even under the "facially incriminating" standard, a confession which replaces the defendant's name with a symbol or neutral pronoun is a violation of the confrontation clause. In
Richardson, the Court stressed that Williams' confession did not
facially incriminate Marsh because all references to Marsh had been
omitted from the confession. 22 4 When a defendant's name is replaced by a symbol or neutral pronoun, however, the confession still
clearly refers to the defendant even though the confession does not
use the defendant's name. A jury cannot avoid filling in the blanks
and discovering that the defendant is the "blank" or "symbol" in
the confession. 2 25 Judge Friendly agreed with this proposition, stating that "[i]t is impossible realistically to suppose that when the
twelve good men and women had [the co-defendant's] . . . confession in the privacy of the jury room, not one yielded to the nigh
irresistible temptation to fill in the blanks .... -226 In fact, some
authorities have suggested that a confession with a blank or symbol
in place of the defendant's name is actually more devastating to the
223 Richardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 n.5. Justice Scalia stated: "We express no opinion
on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced
with a symbol or neutral pronoun."
224 Id. at 1709.

225 See Dawson,Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Effwienies and

Preudices,77 MICH. L. REv. 1379, 1414 (1979) (the edited confession makes it "as clear as
pointing and shouting" that the defendant is the "X" or the "another person" named in
the confession); Haddad, ProsecutorialApproaches to Avoiding Severence After Bruton v.
United States, 19, No. 3 PROSEcUrOR 37, 40 (1986)(noting that simplistic methods of
editing out the defendant's name is ineffective in protecting the defendant); Note, The

Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a
Proposalfor Their Resolution, supra note 180, at 347 (arguing that under New Jersey law,

references to the defendant as "X, Y, or Z" or to "another Negro male" or to "Blank"
are ineffective deletions); Note, Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 150, at 990 (noting that
the desirability of placing an "X" for the defendant's name as a substitute for severence
is doubtful); Note,Jointand Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the FederalRules of Criminal

Procedure,supra note 189, at 564 n.55 (arguing that the substitution of "Mr. Blank" for
the name of the inculpated defendant usually is not enough to cure the harm).
226 United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 1966).
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defendant than a confession which expressly names the defendant
because the former draws the special attention of the jurors, and
their tendency to fill in the blank makes it even harder for them to
disregard the confession. 227 Thus, a confession that replaces the
defendant's name with a symbol or pronoun is still "facially incriminating" even though it does not expressly refer to the defendant's
name.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Richardson v. Marsh, the Supreme Court significantly limited
the scope of Bruton v. United States. The Court held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession with proper
limiting instructions when all references to the defendant are removed from the confession, even if the confession inculpates the
defendant when linked with other evidence introduced at trial.
According to the Court, such a confession need not be excluded under Bruton because Bruton was only intended to apply to
co-defendant confessions which "facially incriminate" the defendant. The Court rationalized this interpretation by asserting that a
jury will be able to follow its limiting instructions when the confession incriminates the defendant only by "contextual implication."
The Court further argued that a reading of Bruton which encompasses "contextual implication" confessions would harm the efficiency of the criminal justice system more than it would benefit the
defendant.
However, the Richardson Court's interpretation of Bruton is erroneous because Bruton was intended to apply to all confessions which
were "powerfully incriminating" against the defendant. The Richardson Court failed to recognize that the "powerfully incriminating"
standard in Bruton was not limited to "facially incriminating" confessions but rather included all confessions which added substantial
weight to the state's case in a form not subject to cross-examination.
Furthermore, the Richardson Court's interpretation of Bruton creates
the illogical result of admitting a confession which implicates the
defendant by "contextual implication" even if it is more devastating
227 Comment, Post-Conspiracy Admissions in Joint Prosecutions, supra note 150, at 713.
This conclusion is based on an experiment by the Jury Project at the University of Chicago Law School which used a moot case and thirty moot juries. Id. at 713 n.21. This
experiment is reported in Kalvan, Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chi-

cago Law School (speech given on Nov. 5, 1955, to a Conference on Legal Research at
the University of Michigan Law School, on file at the University of Chicago Law School
Library).
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than a confession which "facially incriminates" the defendant. Finally, even if the exclusion of confessions which inculpate the defendant by "contextual implication" causes a reduction in the
efficiency of the criminal justice system, this price is small compared
to the cost of violating an individual's confrontation rights under
the sixth amendment.
The effects of the Supreme Court's holding in Richardson v.
Marsh are disturbing. The Court's overly narrow interpretation of
Bruton will have the unfortunate effect of increasing the chance that
a nonconfessing defendant at a joint trial will be prejudiced by evidence which is inadmissible against him. Such an effect is neither
dictated by Bruton nor acceptable in our criminal justice system.
WILLIAM

G. DICKETr

